Abstract-The literature on communication-induced checkpointing presents a family of protocols that use logical clocks to control whether forced checkpoints must be taken. For many years, HMNR, also called Fully Informed (FI), was the most complex and efficient protocol of this family. The Lazy-FI protocol applies a lazy strategy that defers the increase of logical clocks, resulting in a protocol with better perfomance for distributed systems where processes can take basic checkpoints at different, asymmetric, rates. Recently, the Fully Informed aNd Efficient (FINE) protocol was proposed using the same control structures as FI, but with a stronger and, presumably better, checkpoint-inducing condition. FINE and its lazy version, called Lazy-FINE, would now be the most efficient checkpointing protocols based on logical clocks. This paper reviews this family of protocols, proves a theorem on a condition that must be enforced by all stronger versions of FI, and proves that both FINE and Lazy-FINE do not guarantee the absence of useless checkpoints. As a consequence, FI and Lazy-FI can be rolled back to the position of most efficient protocols of this family of index-based checkpointing protocols.
INTRODUCTION
C HECKPOINTING is a widely used technique that provides fault-tolerance to distributed systems. A local checkpoint is a state of a process that can be recovered after a crash. A consistent global checkpoint [1] is a set of local checkpoints that can be used to recover a system after a global failure. If processes take checkpoints at their own pace, a consistent global checkpoint may not be formed, and, in the worst case, the application may need to rollback to its initial state after a failure. This is the well-known domino effect [2] caused by the presence of useless checkpoints [3] .
Some checkpointing protocols avoid useless checkpoints by using a coordinator and control messages [1] , [4] . Others use a communication-induced approach: processes can take basic checkpoints autonomously, but the protocol uses information obtained from the exchange of messages among the processes to induce forced ones and, thus, to eliminate the occurrence of useless checkpoints [5] , [6] . Checkpoint-inducing conditions based on information stored in local variables and messages received are used to control whether a forced checkpoint must be taken before delivering the payload of a message to the application. Therefore, communication-induced protocols are often compared in terms of the number of forced checkpoints and the size of the state (data structures) maintained by each process to support the Unfortunately, no matter what mechanism is used to trigger forced checkpoints, there is not an optimal checkpointing protocol for all checkpoint and communication patterns [14] . However, for a particular family of protocols, a stronger (more restrictive) condition always produces a protocol that takes fewer checkpoints than a protocol based on a weaker condition [14] . Evidence obtained from experimental comparisons of checkpointing protocols also indicate that stronger conditions usually lead to more efficient protocols [10] , [15] . For many years, the HMNR protocol [10] implemented the strongest index-based checkpointinducing condition. This protocol has also been called Fully Informed (FI) [11] , because it propagates detailed information about the causal past of the processes. Eventually, the literature began to show efforts to produce further optimized versions of FI. The Lazy-FI [16] approach applies the lazy strategy [17] to increment logical clocks of FI. The Fully Informed aNd Efficient (FINE) protocol [15] , [18] is based on a checkpoint condition stronger than the one defined for FI but using the same control information maintained by FI. A lazy version of this protocol, called Lazy-FINE was also proposed [19] . The S-FI [20] protocol aims to take the same number of forced checkpoints as FI, but employing a reduced amount of information per message exchanged, an improvement that makes the protocol more scalable. The DCFI [21] delays nonforced checkpoints in order to reduce the total number of checkpoints in the system.
The contributions of the paper are three. Firstly, it reviews the FI [10] and Lazy-FI [16] checkpointing protocols to single out the similaries in logical structure of the conditions used by them to trigger forced checkpoints. Secondly, it proves a theorem that shows that checkpoint-inducing condition of FI cannot be strengthened without respecting the timestamping rules that guarantee the absence of useless checkpoints. Thirdly, it shows that FINE [15] and Lazy-FINE [19] fail the test established by the theorem, thus causing a rollback in the history of communicationinduced checkpointing protocols: FI and Lazy-FI are back as the most efficient protocols of this family of index-based checkpointing protocols.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents fundamental concepts. Section 3 addresses index-based checkpointing, describing FI [10] and Lazy-FI [16] . Section 4 presents FINE [15] and Lazy-FINE [19] , the theorem about the correctness of FI optimizations, and the checkpoint scenarios that show that these protocols may lead to useless checkpoints. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
This section defines the meaning of distributed computation, checkpoint, consistent global checkpoint and the mechanisms used to track whether checkpoints belong or not to a consistent global checkpoint.
Distributed computation
A set of n processes (P 1 , . . . , P n ) that communicate strictly via unicast messages forms a distributed computation. The communication graph is complete, the channels are reliable, but the transmission delays are unpredictable. There is no global clock or shared memory.
Every process P i starts with an event e i,1 and executes a possibly infinite sequence of events (e i,1 , e i,2 , . . .). An internal event can only influence the state of the process that has executed it. External events can be the sending or the receiving of messages. Given global time absence, events can be ordered using solely the notion of "cause-and-effect" enabled by the flow of information generated by the ocurrence of internal and external events. Thus, causality can be captured by the causally precedes relation over events of a distributed computation [7] .
(3) Fig. 1 . Processes, checkpoints, and logical clocks Definition 2.1 (Causal precedence). Event e i,x causally precedes e j,y (e i,x → e j,y ) if
• i = j and y = x + 1, or • ∃m : e i,x = send(m) and e j,y = receive(m), or • ∃e k,z : e i,x → e k,z ∧ e k,z → e j,y .
Fault tolerance and checkpoints
We assume the crash-recover fault model, that is, in the case of a failure, a process halts and looses its volatile state. During correct execution, processes frequently save their states to stable storage to make possible the recovery of a process (system) by way of a rollback to an earlier consistent state in the case of partial or total system failure. A checkpoint is the local state of a process that was saved on stable storage. Every process P i has an initial checkpoint, denoted by C i,1 , and other checkpoints can be saved along the computation. The x-th checkpoint of a process P i is denoted by C i,x . An interval I i,x is the set of events from C i,x to C i,x+1 , including C i,x but excluding C i,x+1 .
Let us assume that a process P i manages a logical clock lc i that is used to timestamp a checkpoint C i,x with C i,x .t and a message m with m.t. The following rules guarantee that if C i,x → C j,y then C i,x .t < C j,y .t [10] . These rules can be seen as a specialization of the Lamport's clock [7] that increments lc i only at the occurrence of checkpoints.
• P i initializes lc i at the beginning of the computation;
• P i increments lc i before it saves a checkpoint C and sets C.t = lc i .
• when P i sends a message m, it piggybacks lc i on the message (denoted m.t);
• when P i receives a message m, it sets lc i to max(lc i , m.t). 
Consistency
A consistent global checkpoint is formed by a set of checkpoints that are unrelated by causal precedence [1] . In Fig. 1 , for example, the set {C 1,2 , C 2,2 , C 3,2 } is a consistent global checkpoint.
Definition 2.2 (Consistent global checkpoint).
When two causally unrelated checkpoints cannot be part of the same consistent global checkpoint they must be connected by a sequence of messages called a zigzag path [3] . • P i sends m l1 after C i,x , and
same or a later checkpoint interval, and
• m lq is received by P j before C j,y . The existence of a zigzag path from
is a zigzag path from C 1,1 to C 3,2 such that C 1,1 causally precedes C 3,2 , being an example of a causal zigzag path. The zigzag path [m 4 , m 3 ] is an example of a non-causal zigzag path from C 1,2 to C 3,3 .
Definition 2.4 (Z-cycle).
A zigzag path from a checkpoint to itself forms a Z-cycle and makes it impossible for this checkpoint to be part of any consistent global checkpoint. A Zcycle is the exact condition under which a checkpoint becomes useless [3] . In 
Z-consistent timestamping Definition 2.5 (Z-consistent timestamping). A timestamping is consistent with the existence of zigzag paths if
A Z-consistent timestamping does not admit a Zcycle, say C z −→ C, since the relationship C.t < C.t is impossible using integers as timestamps [10] , [22] . 
(b) Fig. 3 . Partly-informed strategy
INDEX-BASED CHECKPOINTING
This section starts with the description of a partlyinformed strategy to induce forced checkpoints. After that, it presents the fully-informed and lazy strategies describing data structures and checkpoint-inducing conditions that can be used to reduce the number of forced checkpoints in comparison to the partlyinformed strategy.
Partly-informed strategy
The partly-informed strategy produces a Z-consistent timestamping by not allowing logical clocks to decrease along a zigzag path. Let us consider zigzag paths composed by two messages [m 2 , m 1 ], as the ones depicted in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3a , P i receives m 2 and m 2 .t = m 1 .t. In Fig. 3b , P i receives m 2 , and since m 2 .t > m 1 .t, P i takes a forced checkpoint, represented by a black diamond, before delivering m 2 to the application. This approach can be implemented by the following control structures [10] :
cates whether processes P i has sent a message to P j in the current checkpointing interval.
• Array min to i [1 . . . n]: min to i [j] indicates the timestamp of the first message sent in the current interval by P i to P j or +∞ if no such message has been sent. The partly-informed checkpoint-inducing condition CPI, evaluated by process P i when it receives a message m, can be expressed as [10] :
As a consequence of the partly-informed strategy, P k does not need to take a checkpoint before the reception of m 1 , even when m 1 .t is greater than lc k , as in Fig. 3b. 
Fully-informed strategy
Taking into account a zigzag path [m 2 , m 1 ] from C j,y to C k,z , like the ones depicted on Fig. 3 , the fully-informed strategy [10] explores P i 's information about C k,z .t to establish if Z-consistent timestamping is being preserved. This information is propagated by piggybacking timestamp vectors and checkpoint vectors that carry causal information about P k to P i .
Strengthening the partly-informed strategy
Let us assume that each process P i maintains and propagates an array with information about the logical clock of all processes in the computation. Let us define the vector clock i , such that clock i [i] is equivalent to lc i and clock i [k] is the highest value of lc k that P i knows about due to a traditional piggybacking mechanism. Fig. 4 illustrates timestamp vectors, with the logical clocks of processes and messages emphasized in boldface.
In Fig. 4a , there is a message receive where the CPI condition is true. P 2 sends a message m 1 to P 3 with m 1 .t = 1 and it receives m 3 from P 1 with m 3 .t = 2. However, since m 3 . clock[3] = 2 it does not need to save a forced checkpoint. In this case, C 1,2 z −→ C 3,3 , C 1,2 .t < C 3,3 .t and a Z-consistent timestamping is enforced.
In Fig. 4b , when P 2 receives m 2 from P 3 a similar scenario occurs. The partly-informed condition is true, since m 1 .t = 1 and m 2 .t = 2. However, m 2 . clock[3] = 2 and P 2 does not need to save a forced checkpoint. When P 2 receives m 3 from P 1 with m 3 .t = 2, the partly-informed condition is true again. Nevertheless, since clock 2 [3] = 2 a forced checkpoint is not necessary. As in the previous example, C 1,2 z −→ C 3,3 , C 1,2 .t < C 3,3 .t and a Z-consistent timestamping is enforced.
A variation CFI 1 of the partly-informed checkpointinducing condition, evaluated by process P i when it receives a message m and that takes into account the value of lc k up to P i 's knowledge, can be expressed as [10] :
The CFI 1 condition can also be implemented with a reduced set of data structures [10] to minimize the cost of piggybacking information about the processes causal past. In the FI algorithm, there is no need for a process to know exactly which is the clock of another process. It is just important to know if their clocks are synchronized or not. Thus, FI can be rewritten using lc 
their clocks are synchronized. Due to the update rules of the timestamps, it is not possible that Fig. 4c presents a distributed computation with greater vectors, but instead of using true and false to indicate the truthfulness/falseness of the predicate we have used the signs > or =. The logical clock of processes and messages are emphasized in boldface and they are maintained in their positions in the vectors.
When P 2 receives m 2 from P 3 with m 2 .t = 1 it triavially does not need to take a forced checkpoint. When P 2 receives m 3 from P 1 with m 3 .t = 2, since m 3 . greater [3] , P 2 takes a forced checkpoint before delivering m 3 . The FI condition can be stated as [10] : [10] . Fig. 5 shows a computation with greater vectors and checkpoint vectors with taken marks; an entry k of the checkpoint array is underlined only if taken[k] is true.
The condition to break [µ, m] Z-cycles can be expressed using the following condition CFI 2 , evaluated by process P i when it receives a message m [10] :
The checkpoint-inducing condition of FI is an oroperation of the conditions explained before: 1. The taken array has the opposite meaning of the boolean array 
; end if end for deliver (m) Fig. 6 . FI protocol [10] P i . . .
(c) Fig. 7 . Lazy indexing strategy
Lazy strategy
The lazy strategy reduces the number of forced checkpoints necessary to produce a Z-consistent timestamping by detecting when a basic checkpoint can be taken by a process P i without incrementing its logical clock lc i . Let us consider the situation of a process P i that receives a single message m 1 in a checkpoint interval and later decides to take a basic checkpoint that ends this interval, as depicted in Fig. 7 . If m 1 .t < C i,x .t, P i can reuse the same timestamp of C i,x to label C i,x+1 because C k,z .t < C i,x+1 .t will still hold, as Fig. 7a shows. However, if m 1 .t ≥ C i,x .t, P i must increment lc i to label C i,x+1 in order to produce a Z-consistent timestamping where C k,z .t < C i,x+1 .t, as depicted in Fig. 7b and Fig. 7c . The lazy strategy can be implemented by introducing a flag increment that signals P i it must increment lc i before taking a basic checkpoint. This flag is set to false in the beginning of each checkpoint interval and is set to true whenever a message with m.t ≥ lc i is received. The setting of the increment flag is illustrated in Fig. 7 by a + sign.
Lazy-FI protocol
Let us try to apply the lazy approach to FI using the vector greater. In Fig. 8a , when P 2 receives m 5 from P 1 with a greater clock, it can verify that P 3 have already reached the same clock. However, due to the lazy strategy, P 2 does not know whether P 3 will increase its clock to save the next checkpoint. Thus, a forced checkpoint before the delivering of m 5 will be required in order to guarantee a Z-consistent timestamping.
Fortunately, a small variation in the greater vector allows the implementation of the lazy strategy. The entry greater i [i] is set to false at every checkpoint and set to true when a process set its increment flag [16] . To differentiate the vector used in Lazy-FI to the one used in FI, we are going to introduce an equivalent vector with an intuitive meaning: equal incr. Each entry equal incr i [k] is true if to the knowledge of
(a) lc and greater are not enough
(b) lc and equal incr
[00012]
(c) lc, equal incr, ckptv, and taken 
; end if end for deliver(m); Fig. 9 . Lazy-FI protocol (adapted from [16] ) P i its clock is equal to the clock of P k and P k will increase its clock before saving the next checkpoint. When equal incr i [k] is false, we have no additional information whether the clock of P i is greater or equal to the clock of P k . Fig. 8b shows the propagation of equal incr and it is very similar to Fig. 8a . Once again, instead of true and false values, we have used the signs + and ≥. Due to an extra message from P 5 , P 3 will increase its clock before saving the next checkpoint. P 2 receives this information and does not take a forced checkpoint before delivering m 7 . Fig. 8c shows another similar situation that emphasizes the need of the vectors ckpt and taken. Although upon the reception of m 7 P 2 receives the information that P 3 will increase its clock, P 2 will take a forced checkpoint to break the Z-cycle [m 7 , m 4 , m 6 ].
The conditions used in the Lazy-FI protocol can be stated as follows: Fig. 9 presents the code that implements the Lazy-FI protocol [16] using the equal incr vector.
ATTEMPTS TO OPTIMIZE FI AND LAZY-FI
This section starts with a description of the FINE approach to optimize FI. After that, it presents a property that must be followed by all optimizations of FI and proves that both FINE and Lazy-FINE do not guarantee the absence of useless checkpoints.
The FINE approach
The basic FINE protocol tries to reduce the number of forced checkpoints using the same data structures as the FI protocol. Fig. 10 illustrates the approach. P 2 has sent a message m 1 to P 3 with m 1 .t = 1. When P 2 receives m 3 from P 1 , it verifies that m 3 .t > m 1 .t and lc 3 , up to P 2 's knowledge, has not reached 2 yet. However, since m 3 . taken [2] is false, the messages involve no Z-cycle. They are called harmless cycles.
The basic FINE protocol is based on the following condition [15] :
where condition CFINE 1 can be expressed using a greater vector [19] and CFINE 2 is equivalent to CFI 2 .
Fig . 11 presents the code that implements the CFINE 1 predicate. The complete basic FINE protocol is implemented by replacing the FI 1() with FINE 1() in Fig. 6 .
A lazy version of the FINE protocol, called Lazy-FINE, has been proposed in the literature [19] . Let us define the checkpoint inducing conditions using the vector equal incr:
CLazy-FINE 2 ≡ CFI 2 Fig. 12 presents the code that implements the CLazy-FINE 1 predicate. The complete basic Lazy-FINE protocol is implemented by replacing the Lazy FI 1() with Lazy FINE 1() in Fig. 9 . Fig. 13 . Necessity of a Z-consistent timestamping
FI's optimization limits
The timestamps of Fig. 10 are not Z-consistent, since
t. This violation of Z-consistency may appear innocuous at first, but it violates an important property of any FI optimization. Suppose one considers the CFI 1 ∧ P ∨ CFI 2 as capable of producing a more efficient protocol, and CFI 2 is kept exactly as in the original condition. Theorem 4.1 proves that CFI 1 ∧ P must enforce a Z-consistent timestamping to be a valid optimization. Proof: Assume an optimization of the FI protocol with condition CFI 1 ∧ P ∨ CFI 2 where CFI 1 ∧ P does not enforce a Z-consistent timestamping. Thus, there must be a computation with two checkpoints C i,x and C j,y such as C i,x z −→ C j,y and C i,x .t ≥ C j,y .t. For simplicity, let C i,x .t = α + δ, C j,y .t = α with δ ≥ 0 and ζ be the zigzag path between C i,x and C j,y (Fig. 13a) . Depending on the properties of CFI 1 ∧ P, this computation can be arbitrarily complex, involving other processes and requiring many messages exchanges. Let us assume that this computation does not enforce a Z-consistent timestamping, but has no useless checkpoint.
We add to the computation another message m j sent by P j as the first event of the interval I j,y and received by P i in the interval I i,x after the first message of ζ is sent (Fig. 13b) . By our construction m j .t = α. This implies that C i,x C j,y , and that CFI 2 can never be true. Evaluating CFI 1 at the time m j is received, m j .t ≤ α + δ and no checkpoint is forced upon the reception of m j , no matter the existence of P. Since ζ must be non-causal, the z-cycle formed by m j and ζ is not detected by CFI 2 and the protocol allowed the occurrence of a useless checkpoint C j,y . FINE may lead to useless checkpoints According to Theorem 4.1, the CFINE 1 predicate produces a checkpointing protocol that does not guarantee the absence of useless checkpoints. Indeed, Fig. 14 is a counterexample: it shows a possible continuation of the scenario presented in Fig. 10 that leads to the occurrence of a useless checkpoint. When P 2 receives m 3 from P 1 , there is no Z-cycle known to P 2 closed by the receipt of m 3 . However, this does not exclude the formation of a Z-cycle, undetected at the time m 3 is received.
Lazy-FINE may lead to useless checkpoints Theorem 4.1 also informs us that the CLazy-FINE 1 predicate does not guarantee the absence of useless checkpoints. In Fig. 15 , when P 3 receives m 4 from P 2 , m 4 .t > lc 3 , but since ¬m.taken [3] , [m 4 , m 2 , m 3 ] would form just a harmless Z-cycle. However, P 3 receives m 5 from P 4 with m 5 .t = lc 3 no forced checkpoint is taken and a Z-cycle m 5 , m 4 , m 2 is formed.
CONCLUSION
This paper reviewed index-based checkpointing protocols and proved that the FINE and Lazy-FINE protocols do not guarantee the absence of useless checkpoints. This paper also reinforces that all optimizations of FI must enforce a Z-consistent timestamping.
As a consequence, FI and Lazy-FI can be rolled back to the position of most efficient index-based protocols; whether or not they can be further optimized remains an open problem.
